Part I: The Situation
The Market Landscape (Early 2000s)
Two companies dominate home video entertainment, but they couldn't be more different in their approaches:
Blockbuster: The Incumbent Giant
By 2004, Blockbuster Video operated over 9,000 stores worldwide with annual revenues exceeding $5.9 billion. The company's business model was built on physical retail presence—bright blue storefronts on nearly every major street corner in America. Its competitive advantage was clear: massive scale, brand recognition, and the convenience of immediate gratification. Customers could walk in, browse physical shelves, and leave with a movie in minutes.
The company's profitability was heavily dependent on late fees, which generated approximately $800 million annually—nearly 16% of total revenue. This created a perverse incentive: the business model actually benefited when customers forgot to return movies on time. Store managers knew the numbers intimately: inventory turns, shelf space optimization, and the precise revenue contribution of new releases versus catalog titles.
Netflix: The Scrappy Upstart
Netflix, founded in 1997 by Reed Hastings and Marc Randolph, started as a DVD-by-mail service with a radically different value proposition: no late fees, no due dates, and a subscription model that allowed unlimited rentals. The company competed on convenience of a different kind—the convenience of selection and simplicity. With no physical stores to maintain, Netflix could offer a catalog 10 times larger than the typical Blockbuster location.
By 2004, Netflix had grown to 2.6 million subscribers and generated $500 million in revenue—impressive, but still less than 10% of Blockbuster's size. The company's operations were centered around massive distribution warehouses and a sophisticated logistics network that could deliver DVDs to 90% of subscribers within one business day. But Reed Hastings knew the DVD business was transitional. He famously said the company's goal was to become so good at DVD delivery that customers would tolerate the eventual shift to streaming.
The Technological Shift
Between 2000 and 2007, a quiet revolution was taking place in American homes. Broadband internet penetration exploded from 5% to over 50% of U.S. households. Connection speeds improved from dial-up's 56 Kbps to cable and DSL services offering 1-5 Mbps—fast enough to stream video, albeit at relatively low quality. YouTube's launch in 2005 demonstrated consumer appetite for online video, even when quality was poor.
For executives at both companies, the question wasn't whether streaming would arrive—it was when, how fast, and what to do about it. The technology was still immature. Streaming quality couldn't match DVDs. Content licensing for digital distribution was expensive and complicated. And most critically, neither company knew if consumers would accept trading ownership and quality for convenience and instant access.
The Fork in the Road
By 2007, both companies faced the same strategic question, but from vastly different positions:
| Dimension | Netflix | Blockbuster |
|---|---|---|
| Core Business | DVD-by-mail subscription | Physical retail rental stores |
| Annual Revenue | $1.2 billion | $5.5 billion |
| Infrastructure | 58 distribution centers | 7,800 retail stores |
| Fixed Costs | Relatively low (warehouses, shipping) | Extremely high (real estate, staff, inventory) |
| Customer Relationship | Direct subscription, home delivery | Transactional, in-store visits |
| Late Fee Revenue | $0 (eliminated by design) | ~$600-800 million annually |
| Technology Investment | Heavy focus on algorithms, streaming R&D | Minimal; focused on inventory management |
| Debt Load | Manageable | $1+ billion |
Blockbuster had already made one critical error: in 2000, Netflix approached Blockbuster with an offer to be acquired for $50 million. Blockbuster CEO John Antioco declined, viewing Netflix as a niche player. But by 2007, both companies recognized that streaming wasn't a distant future—it was arriving, and strategic choices had to be made.
For Netflix, the decision was existential: invest heavily in streaming technology and content licensing, potentially cannibalizing their growing DVD business, or continue optimizing DVD-by-mail and risk becoming irrelevant. For Blockbuster, the calculus was different: pivot toward streaming and jeopardize $5+ billion in retail revenue and thousands of stores, or maintain focus on the proven, profitable core business while monitoring digital trends.